Presidentialism, Violence, and the Prospect of Democracy

This book tackles the perennial debate about whether presidentialism is associated with democratic breakdown. We integrate both institutional and behavioral arguments to discuss how institutional rigidity in changing executive power would stimulate citizens to adopt relatively violent means to address their grievances. Evidence from cross-national surveys is collected, and the results show that our central premises are indeed supported. We then employ a cross-national time-series data from 1946 to 2008 to examine the conditions in which a democracy enters into a crisis, and the conditions in which a crisis escalates into a democratic breakdown. Although the book finds evidence that presidentialism could contribute instabilities to a democratic system, it does not directly follow that those instabilities will trigger a democratic breakdown. In other words, presidential democracies are more likely to encounter crises than either parliamentary or semi-presidential systems. However, once a crisis occurs, presidentialism does not trigger a higher likelihood of a breakdown. The conventional wisdom is thus only half correct.